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Abstract
■ Humans automatically imitate other peopleʼs actions during
social interactions, building rapport and social closeness in the
process. Although the behavioral consequences and neural cor-
relates of imitation have been studied extensively, little is known
about the neural mechanisms that control imitative tendencies.
For example, the degree to which an agent is perceived as
human-like influences automatic imitation, but it is not known
how perception of animacy influences brain circuits that control
imitation. In the current fMRI study, we examined how the per-
ception and belief of animacy influence the control of automatic
imitation. Using an imitation–inhibition paradigm that involves
suppressing the tendency to imitate an observed action, we
manipulated both bottom–up (visual input) and top–down (belief )
cues to animacy. Results show divergent patterns of behavioral
and neural responses. Behavioral analyses show that automatic
imitation is equivalent when one or both cues to animacy are
present but reduces when both are absent. By contrast, right TPJ
showed sensitivity to the presence of both animacy cues. Thus,
we demonstrate that right TPJ is biologically tuned to control
imitative tendencies when the observed agent both looks like
and is believed to be human. The results suggest that right TPJ
may be involved in a specialized capacity to control automatic
imitation of human agents, rather than a universal process of con-
flict management, which would be more consistent with generalist
theories of imitative control. Evidence for specialized neural cir-
cuitry that “controls” imitation offers new insight into developmen-
tal disorders that involve atypical processing of social information,
such as autism spectrum disorders. ■
INTRODUCTION
Humans automatically imitate other peopleʼs actions, a pro-
cess that builds rapport, liking, and affiliation between indi-
viduals (Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009). Many social factors
influence howmuch we imitate others, such as the appear-
ance, status, and attitudes of interaction partners, as well
as our own prior knowledge and beliefs (Heyes, 2011; van
Baaren, Janssen, Chartrand, & Dijksterhuis, 2009). How-
ever, the neural mechanisms that control the tendency to
imitate other people based on social context are not well
known. The aim of the current study is to investigate
how cues to animacy, specifically physical appearance and
belief, influence the neural mechanisms that control auto-
matic imitation.
The neural basis of imitation has been studied exten-
sively, with inferior frontal and parietal cortices implicated
in a process that matches observed movements with
stored action representations (Iacoboni, 2009; Rizzolatti
& Craighero, 2004). The potency of this automatic match-
ing mechanism (i.e., the degree to which observed move-
ments interfere with performed movements) is influenced
by perception of human animacy (Gowen & Poliakoff,
2012; Press, 2011). Interference is reduced or absent when
an agent has a nonhuman, robotic form (Press, Bird, Flach,
& Heyes, 2005; Kilner, Paulignan, & Blakemore, 2003) and
also when prior knowledge suggests the agent is not
human (Liepelt & Brass, 2010; Longo & Bertenthal, 2009;
Tsai & Brass, 2007). These data suggest that both bottom–
up (i.e., visual input) and top–down (i.e., knowledge and
beliefs) cues to animacy influence the degree to which
observed actions are automatically imitated and thus
require cognitive control.
Two candidate brain regions for controlling imitation
based on perceptions of animacy are anterior medial
pFC (mPFC) and right TPJ (rTPJ). These brain regions
are consistently engaged in human brain imaging stud-
ies of imitation–inhibition (Brass, Ruby, & Spengler,
2009; Brass, Zysset, & von Cramon, 2001). Furthermore,
lesions in these areas are associated with disrupted control
of imitative tendencies (Spengler, von Cramon, & Brass,
2010; Brass, Derrfuss, Matthes-von Cramon, & von Cramon,
2003), whereas anodal (excitatory) stimulation to rTPJ via
transcranial direct current stimulation improves imitation–
inhibition performance (Santiesteban, Banissy, Catmur, &
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Bird, 2012). Both anterior mPFC and rTPJ are engaged when
reasoning about othersʼ mental states, such as beliefs,
desires, and intentions (Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009)
and altered responses in these regions have been associ-
ated with atypical processing of social information in autism
spectrum disorders (ASD; Marsh & Hamilton, 2011; Castelli,
Frith, Happe, & Frith, 2002). Together, these findings impli-
cate anterior mPFC and rTPJ as key regions for controlling
social interactions with other animate, intentional agents
(Frith & Frith, 2010; Adolphs, 2009).
In the present fMRI study, we used an imitation–inhibition
paradigm devised by Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschlager, and
Prinz (2000), which involves performing an action while
simultaneously observing a congruent or an incongruent
action. RT measurements provide an index of imitative
control, as greater cognitive resources are required to
inhibit actions that are incongruent than congruent with
oneʼs own intentions (Heyes, 2011; Brass & Heyes,
2005). Characteristics of the observed agent were manipu-
lated to independently vary both bottom–up and top–
down cues to human animacy. The bottom–up manipula-
tion varied the physical form of the agent (human vs.
robot), whereas the top–down manipulation varied prior
instructions about how the observed movements were
made (human motion capture vs. a computer animation
algorithm). Thus, evaluating the interactions in our fac-
torial design between congruency, form, and belief directly
addresses our main research question, which is how cues
to animacy influence brain circuits of imitative control
(Figure 1). Consistent with previous work (Gowen &
Poliakoff, 2012; Press, 2011), we expect animacy cues to
increase the potency of automatic imitation. At the neural
level, we hypothesize that anterior mPFC and rTPJ will
index sensitivity to imitative control based on these cues
to human animacy.
METHODS
Participants
Nineteen right-handed students (17 women, 2 men;
Mage = 21.95 years, SD = 1.73 years) of Radboud Uni-
versity Nijmegen participated in this study. All participants
were native German speakers and received course credit
or A15 for their participation. Informed consent was
obtained in accordance with the local ethics board.
Task and Stimuli
The paradigm was based on prior imitation–inhibition
experiments (Brass et al., 2000). The task involved de-
pressing two buttons, one with the index and one with
the middle finger of the right hand, and releasing one
button depending on the appearance of a numerical cue.
When a “1” appeared, participants lifted their index finger,
whereas when a “2” appeared, participants lifted their
middle finger. The numerical cue was presented between
the index and middle fingers of a virtual left hand, which
was displayed in a third-person viewpoint. Three aspects
in the imitation–inhibition task were manipulated (Fig-
ure 1A). First, the congruency between observed and per-
formed finger movements was manipulated. The virtual
hand either lifted the same finger as the participant (con-
gruent) or the other finger (incongruent). Second, the
agentʼs physical form was manipulated by displaying
either a human-like or a non-human-like hand. Third, par-
ticipantsʼ belief about how the movements were created
was manipulated such that they were led to believe they
were observing a movement created by real human move-
ments or by a computer program.
Computer animations of index and middle finger lifting
movements were created using “Poser 6” animation soft-
ware (poser.smithmicro.com). The Poser stimuli were con-
structed using standard key frame animation procedures
where the start and the end posture of the movement is
defined, and the program interpolates the appropriate
movement timing and trajectory to make the movement
between the start and end posture as smooth and biolog-
ical-looking as possible. To manipulate the physical form
of the hand, two virtual models were used: a human-like
model and a non-human-like model (Figure 1A). The
human hand model closely resembled a real human hand,
whereas the nonhuman hand model comprised a number
of purple blocks that roughly resembled two “fingers” and
otherwise bore no resemblance to a human hand. The
brightness of the stimuli was matched as closely as possible
so that both hands contrasted equally against the back-
ground. Only prior to the experiment were participants
shown the real Poser animation videos as part of the cover
story. During the experiment, participants saw two critical
frames that were taken from the full movement animation
of the finger lift. The timing of the presentation of the two
still images (which, in succession, produced believable
apparent motion of a finger lift) were as follows: Frame 1
(initial, resting posture): 1000-msec duration and Frame 2
(final, extended posture): 1500-msec duration. Two ver-
sions of each finger lifting movement were created to
increase the efficacy of the belief manipulation (see
below). One version showed the finger fully stretched in
the final position, and one version showed where the
finger was not fully stretched in the final position.
To manipulate what participants believed about the ob-
served movements, they were told that the aim of the
experiment was to investigate how movements produced
through different animation techniques are evaluated and
processed in the brain. It was explained that the appraisal
of such movements depends critically on the extent to
which the observer understands how the animated move-
ments were created. A custom-made 10-min video “docu-
mentary” was shown that explained two animation
techniques: human motion capture and computer key
frame animation. Specifically, participants learned that
human motion capture involves recording real human
movement via sensors that are attached to the body,
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whereas computer key frame animation involves a com-
puter algorithm that fills in intermediate frames of a move-
ment between predefined start and end positions. After
the video, participants were asked whether they under-
stood the two techniques and whether they had any
questions about the techniques before the experiment
started.
Each trial had the following structure. A fixation cross was
shown for a jittered duration of 0, 500, 1000, or 1500 msec.
A virtual hand was then displayed in a resting position,
followed by the final frame from the finger lift video (Fig-
ure 1A). Simultaneous to the finger lifting, a number cue
was presented between the index and the middle fin-
ger of the virtual hand: either “1” or “2.” Participants
responded to this cue by lifting either their index or mid-
dle finger, which meant they lifted their finger while ob-
serving a finger lifting action. Finally, the fixation cross
was shown again until the trial duration reached 4.5 sec.
A total of 320 trials were divided into two experimental
runs of equal length and evenly filled a 2 (Congruency: con-
gruent, incongruent) × 2 (Form: human, nonhuman) ×
2 (Belief: motion capture, computer animation) factorial
design. Each run consisted of 20 miniblocks, each com-
prising eight trials. Each miniblock was preceded with a
written cue that informed participants that the movements
they were about to see were created using human mo-
tion capture or computer animation. Dependent on this
message, either the stretched or unstretched finger
Figure 1. (A) Method and design. Each trial had the same structure: A stationary hand was presented first, followed by the appearance of a number
cue and a finger lifting movement. Participants responded to the presentation of the number cue with an index finger lift for the number “1” and a
middle finger lift for the number “2.” Concurrently, the observed hand either lifted the same (congruent) or a different (incongruent) finger. Two
other variables were manipulated: form and belief. The form of the agent could be human or nonhuman. The human hand model closely resembled
a real human hand, whereas the nonhuman hand model comprised a number of three-dimensional purple blocks that were arranged to look like
two “fingers” and otherwise bore no resemblance to a human hand. In addition, participants were exposed to an elaborate 10-min film that was the cover
story to manipulate beliefs about how the videos were made. It was explained the history of motion capture and computer animation techniques
and described how the observed movements were produced by recording real human movement or by using a computer algorithm. Together,
these conditions filled a 2 (congruency: congruent, incongruent) × 2 (form: human, nonhuman) × 2 (belief: motion capture, computer animation)
factorial design. (B) Research questions and analyses. The key contrasts were centered on how the congruency effect (an index of automatic imitation;
Heyes, 2011) was modulated by form and belief. (C) Brain ROIs. Red dots show locations of peak responses in previous fMRI imitation–inhibition studies.
To produce our ROI search volume, 15-mm radius spheres were centered on these coordinates (see Supplementary Table S1 for more details).
The yellow dot is the location of the peak result in the current experiment (see Figure 2 for details). (D) Manipulation check. After the experiment,
participants rated on a 10-point scale how realistic (anchors: 1 = very unrealistic; 10 = very realistic) they perceived the finger lift actions to be
according to the type of animation technique and hand model. The human hand was rated as more realistic than the non-human-like hand and
motion capture actions were rated as more realistic than computer animation actions.
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movements were shown during all trials within the block,
which means that purported motion capture movements
looked slightly different from purported computer anima-
tion movements. The assignment of these two movement
versions to the belief blocks was counterbalanced across
participants so that each movement variation was paired
with each instruction equally across the subject sample.
Within each miniblock, two instances of the four possi-
ble pairings of congruency and form were shown (congru-
ent action, human hand; incongruent action, human hand;
congruent action, human hand; incongruent action, non-
human hand). Thus, an equal number of congruent and
incongruent trials as well as human and nonhuman trials
were shown in a random order in each miniblock. Mini-
blocks were presented pseudorandomly to ensure that a
miniblock type was not presented more than three times
in succession. After each miniblock, a fixation cross ap-
peared for 10 sec. Because of a technical error, the fixation
cross interval was not implemented for six participants.
Before data collection began in the scanner, participants
performed 16 practice trials (eight trials from each belief
manipulation).
After scanning, participants rated on a 10-point scale
how realistic (1 = very unrealistic, 10 = very realistic)
they perceived the finger lift actions to be according to
the type of animation technique and hand model. Finally,
participants were asked whether they believed (yes or no)
that the two finger lift versions were created by different
animation techniques.
Image Acquisition
Images were acquired using a 1.5-T scanner (Magnetom
Avanto, Siemens Medical Solutions, Erlangen, Germany).
Head movement was minimized using a foam pillow and
padding. Stimuli were projected on a screen behind the
scanner, which participants viewed via a head-mounted
mirror, and the task was performed using a button box
that enabled RT recording. Images were acquired using
a multiecho planar pulse sequence (repetition time =
2 sec; echo times = 9.4 msec, 20.96 msec, 32.52 msec,
44.08 msec, 55.64 msec; flip angle = 90°). In both ses-
sions, 500 volumes of axial images were collected per echo
(5000 volumes in total) with 31 slices per repetition time
with a voxel size of 3.3 × 3.3 × 3.5 mm. Before this, 30 vol-
umes were collected during a blank screen, which were
used to calculate T2* weights. These were subsequently
used to combine the echoes by computing a weighted
average of the five echoes (Poser, Versluis, Hoogduin, &
Norris, 2006). For two participants, echoes were not com-
bined (because of errors with weight calculation), and
instead the 32.52-msec echo was used for analysis.
Behavioral Data Analysis
Behavioral data were analyzedwith a 2 (ActionCongruency:
congruent, incongruent)× 2 (Form: human, nonhuman)×
2 (Belief: motion capture, computer animation) repeated-
measures ANOVA. RT was measured as the time between
the presentation of the number cue and the relevant but-
ton release. Main effects of Congruency, Form, and Belief
were calculated. The interaction between Congruency
and Form investigated our bottom–up hypothesis by test-
ing whether the human compared with the nonhuman
model induced a greater congruency effect. The inter-
action between Congruency and Belief investigated our
top–down hypothesis by testing whether a belief that
movements were made by human motion compared with
a computer algorithm induced a greater congruency effect.
Finally, the interaction of all three factors (Congruency,
Form, and Belief ) tested whether the congruency effect
was influenced additionally by the combination of form
and belief manipulations. The three-way interaction ad-
dresses whether the absence or presence of both human
form and a human animacy belief modulate the congruency
effect.
Imaging Data Analysis
Functional data were analyzed with Statistical Parametric
Mapping software (SPM8, Wellcome Department of Cogni-
tive Neurology, London, UK). Functional images were re-
aligned, unwarped, corrected for slice timing, normalized
to the Montreal Neurological Institute template with a
resolution of 3 × 3 × 3 mm, and spatially smoothed using
an 8-mm smoothing kernel. A design matrix was fitted for
each participant with nine regressors, one for each cell of
the factorial design (eight in total; 2 × 2 × 2, see Figure 1)
and one for the message screen prior to each miniblock,
which specified the belief manipulation. Stimulus onsets
were time-locked to the presentation of the number cue
with a duration of zero and convolved with a standard
hemodynamic response function.
To examine our two ROIs (anterior mPFC and rTPJ), a
mask was generated based on coordinates from prior
imitation–inhibition fMRI studies (Figure 1C and Supple-
mentary Table S1). To construct the mask, 15-mm radius
spheres were centered on each of these coordinates, and
this mask was used to constrain further analyses. Main
effects of congruency, form, and belief were evaluated
in both directions. We addressed our primary research
questions by calculating two-way and three-way inter-
actions between the three factors in our design, as out-
lined in Figure 1B. The Congruency × Form interaction
tested for clusters that showed a greater congruency
effect for the human compared with the nonhuman model
[(human_incongruent > congruent) > (nonhuman_
incongruent > congruent)]. The Congruency × Belief
interaction tested for clusters that showed a greater
congruency effect for trials within motion capture com-
pared with computer animation blocks [(motioncapture_
incongruent > congruent) > (computer_incongruent >
congruent)]. The Belief × Form interaction tested for
clusters that showed a greater response to motion capture
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than computer animation blocks for a human than non-
human model [(motioncapture_human > nonhuman) >
(computeranimation_human > nonhuman)]. The Con-
gruency × Form × Belief interaction tested for clusters
that show a greater congruency effect for human compared
with nonhuman form in the motion capture compared
with computer animation belief blocks [((motioncapture_
human_incongruent > congruent) > (motioncapture_
nonhuman_incongruent) > congruent) > (computer_
human_incongruent>congruent)>(computer_nonhuman_
incongruent) > congruent))]. For completeness, we cal-
culated the inverse of each interaction also and report all
findings that pass our thresholding criteria.
In addition to the primary analyses, which are based on
the magnitude of BOLD differences between conditions,
we also performed an exploratory connectivity-based analy-
sis. Brass and colleagues (2009) have proposed that, rather
than acting in isolation, anterior mPFC and rTPJ may act
together during the control of imitative responses. This
proposal leads to the hypothesis that the responses of
anterior mPFC and rTPJ may exhibit functional coupling
during the control of imitation. To test the hypothesis that,
during the control of imitative responses, the functional
relationship between anterior mPFC and rTPJ may be in-
fluenced by bottom–up and top–down cues to animacy,
we implemented a psychophysiological interaction (PPI)
analysis (Friston et al., 1997). PPI can identify brain regions
whose activity shows a change in correlation with a seed
region as a function of a change in a psychological state.
The seed region is the “physiological” element, whereas
the psychological state is the “psychological” element of
PPI. The PPI analysis was conducted using the SPM gener-
alized PPI toolbox (McLaren, Ries, Xu, & Johnson, 2012).
Seed regions were defined based on results that emerged
from the primary magnitude-based analysis of BOLD dif-
ference between conditions. More specifically, any reliable
group-level interaction between congruency and animacy
in anterior mPFC or rTPJ would be explored further using
PPI. To create seed regions, for each individual participant,
we searched within our anterior mPFC–rTPJ mask for
clusters showing the interaction between congruency and
animacy p < .05 (uncorrected; Spunt & Lieberman, 2012).
Volumes were generated using a 6-mm sphere, which was
positioned on the peak of each individualʼs cluster.
PPI models for each participant included nine PPI
regressors, one for each condition from our 2 × 2 × 2
design and one additional regressor for the written cue.
To create these regressors, we first specified the time
series of the rTPJ seed region as the first eigenvariate.
Next, the time series was deconvolved to estimate the
underlying neural activity (Gitelman, Penny, Ashburner,
& Friston, 2003). This deconvolved time series was multi-
plied by the predicted, preconvolved time series of each
of the nine conditions. This resulted in one PPI for each
condition in terms of predicted “neural” activity, which
was then convolved with the canonical hemodynamic re-
sponse function, yielding nine PPI regressors. Each model
also included the time series of each condition convolved
with the canonical hemodynamic response function and
the time series of the seed region as covariates of no
interest (McLaren et al., 2012; Spunt & Lieberman, 2012).
Contrast images were taken to the second level for
random effects analysis. Correction for multiple compari-
sons was performed at the cluster level (Friston, Worsley,
Frackowiak, Mazziotta, & Evans, 1994), using a voxel-level
threshold of p < .005 and 10 voxels and a family-wise
error (FWE) cluster-level correction of p < .05. Significant
clusters of activity were localized with the SPM Anatomy
toolbox (Eickhoff et al., 2005). We only interpret clusters
that pass correction for multiple comparisons, but for
completeness and to aid future meta-analyses (Lieberman
& Cunningham, 2009), clusters that pass the uncorrected
threshold are reported in Table 1 as well as within supple-
mentary materials.
RESULTS
Behavioral Findings
A repeated-measures ANOVA with within-subject factors of
Congruency (congruent, incongruent), Form (human, non-
human), and Belief (motion capture, computer animation)
was performed on RT data. The log-transformed RTs were
used because the distribution of the raw mean average
RTs was positively skewed (Tabachnik & Fidell, 1989).
Error trials (4.3%) and trials that deviated more than
3 standard deviations from the mean RT within each cell
(2.5%) were removed from the analysis. A main effect of
Congruency emerged, F(1, 18) = 124.18, p < .001, ηp
2 =
.87,with longer RTs during incongruent trials comparedwith
congruent trials (Figure 2A).1 There was also a main effect
of Form, F(1, 18) = 8.57, p = .009, ηp
2 = .32, with longer
RTs when the human-like hand was shown compared with
the nonhuman hand (Figure 2A). There was no main effect
of Belief (F < 1).
Because a marginally significant three-way interaction
was found between Congruency, Form, and Belief,
F(1, 18) = 4.42, p = .05, ηp
2 = .20, we analyzed the
Congruency × Form interactions separately within
the two belief conditions. This analysis showed that the
Congruency × Hand interaction was not significant within
motion capture blocks (F < 1), but significant within com-
puter animation blocks, F(1, 18) = 14.86, p = .001, ηp
2 =
.45. In computer animation blocks, the difference between
incongruent and congruent trials was larger when the hu-
man hand was shown compared with the nonhuman hand
(Figure 2A). When the same data are plotted as a con-
gruency effect (Figure 2B), it is clear that the congruency
effect is reduced for the “nonhuman computer animation”
trials compared with the other conditions.
Regarding the bottom–up hypothesis that participants
will experience more interference when perceiving a
human-like hand compared with a nonhuman hand,
although the pattern of the means was in line with our
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prediction, the results showed that the interaction between
Congruency and Hand was not significant (F < 1). Re-
garding our top–down hypothesis, the results showed a
significant two-way interaction between Congruency and
Belief, F(1, 18) = 4.72, p = .04, ηp
2 = .21. The difference
between congruent and incongruent trials was larger
during motion capture blocks compared with computer
animation blocks (Figure 2A). When including whether
participants believed the cover story about the two anima-
tion techniques (yes or no) as a between-subject factor in
the analysis (12 true believers and 7 possible nonbelievers),
we found no significant three-way interaction of this factor
with the Congruency × Belief interaction, neither for the
whole data nor when analyzing only trials with the non-
human hand model (both F < 1). For this reason, we
consider the whole data set in the imaging analyses.
fMRI Findings
Main Effects
No main effects of Congruency, Form, or Belief emerged
that survived correction for multiple comparisons within
the two ROIs (anterior mPFC and rTPJ). At the uncor-
rected threshold ( p < .005, k = 10), there was a main
effect of Congruency (incongruent > congruent) in ante-
rior mPFC and a main effect of Form (human> nonhuman)
in anterior mPFC and rTPJ (Table 1 and Supplementary
Figure S1). No other main effects were present.
Interactions
Neither anterior mPFC nor rTPJ emerged from the two-way
interactionsmeasuring Congruency× Form, Congruency×
Table 1. Clusters of Activity Showing Main Effects and Interactions between the Three Factors in Our Factorial Design: Congruency,
Form, and Belief
Region Number of Voxels t p Cluster Corrected (FWE)
Montreal Neurological
Institute Coordinates
x y z
a) Inconsistent > Consistent
Anterior ventral mPFC 15 4.11 .371 9 44 10
b) Human > Nonhuman
Anterior mPFC 29 3.71 .207 9 62 25
rTPJ 11 3.58 .442 57 −46 16
c) Motion Capture > Computer Animation
No suprathreshold clusters
d) Congruency × Form
rTPJ 20 4.48 .290 60 −55 10
e) Congruency × Belief
No suprathrashold clusters
f ) Belief × Form
No suprathrashold clusters
g) Congruency × Form × Belief
rTPJ 78 4.69 .028 48 −61 28
Anterior mPFC 28 3.51 .198 18 59 25
6 62 22
On the basis of previous studies of imitation–inhibition, our search volume comprised two brain regions: anterior mPFC and rTPJ (see Figure 1C and
Supplementary Table S1 for details). Searching within this mask, we report clusters surviving a voxel-level threshold of p < .005 and 10 voxels with
bold font indicating clusters that survive FWE correction for multiple comparisons ( p < .05 FWE). Subpeaks more than 8 mm from the main peak in
each cluster are listed. We calculated all interaction directions between the three factors in our design and report any significant clusters of activity.
See the Methods section of the main text for a complete list of the interactions calculated.
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Belief, or Belief × Form at the cluster-corrected threshold.
At the uncorrected threshold, a cluster in rTPJ showed a
Congruency × Form interaction (Table 1 and Supplemen-
tary Figure S1).
One cluster located within rTPJ demonstrated a sig-
nificant ( p < .05 FWE-corrected) three-way interaction
measuring Congruency × Form × Belief (Figure 2C). To
explore the interaction further based on our a priori predic-
tions that congruency differences would emerge between
conditions, we extracted parameter estimates from the
cluster peak and compared the difference between in-
congruent and congruent trials for each condition using
four separate paired t tests. A significant difference was
observed between incongruent (M = 0.27, SE = 0.19)
and congruent trials (M = −0.06, SE = 0.19) for the
“human hand with motion capture” condition, t(18) =
−2.1, p < .05 (Figure 2C). All other t tests were not sig-
nificant ( p> .1 in all cases). Thus, rTPJ displayed a greater
congruency effect for human than nonhuman trials in
motion capture miniblocks compared with computer
animation blocks. No response was observed in anterior
mPFC at the corrected threshold, but at the uncorrected
threshold, one anterior mPFC cluster showed the same
three-way interaction (Table 1 and Supplementary Fig-
ure S1). Four follow-up paired t tests comparing congruent
and incongruent conditions were all nonsignificant.
Figure 2. Results. (A) Mean RT. A Consistency × Form × Belief repeated-measures ANOVA showed a marginally significant three-way interaction
( p = .05). To explore this interaction, we analyzed the Congruency × Form interactions separately within the two belief conditions. This analysis
showed that the Congruency × Form interaction was not significant within motion capture blocks ( p > .05) but was significant within computer
animation blocks ( p < .01). In computer animation blocks, the difference between incongruent and congruent trials was larger when the human
hand was shown compared with the nonhuman hand. (B) Congruency effect. To visualize the RT data differently, a congruency effect (RTs for
incongruent minus congruent trials) was plotted for the form and belief conditions. The congruency effect is reduced for the “nonhuman computer
animation” trials compared with the other conditions. (C) Brain imaging data. One cluster located within rTPJ demonstrated a significant ( p < .05,
FWE-corrected for multiple comparisons) three-way interaction between Congruency × Form × Belief. To explore the interaction further, we
extracted parameter estimates from the cluster peak and compared the difference between incongruent and congruent trials for each condition
using four separate paired t tests. A significant difference was observed between incongruent and congruent trials for the “human hand with motion
capture” condition only. All other t tests were not significant ( p > .05 in all cases). No other main effects or interactions survived correction for
multiple comparisons (see Table 1 and Supplementary Figure S1).
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Psychophysiological Interactions
To explore the response in rTPJ further, we performed a
PPI analysis (McLaren et al., 2012; Friston et al., 1997),
which tested the hypothesis that the functional relation-
ship between rTPJ and anterior mPFC is influenced by
bottom–up and top–down cues to animacy. This hypothe-
sis was based on the proposal that anterior mPFC and rTPJ
work together during the control of imitation (Brass et al.,
2009). Our seed selection criteria (see Methods) yielded
17 participants with seed regions. At the initial threshold
( p < .005, k = 10 voxels), we found no response within
our mask. Reducing the voxel extent to k = 5, we found
that rTPJ demonstrated functional coupling with ante-
rior mPFC (Supplementary Table S2 and Supplementary
Figure S2).
We also tested one further hypothesis regarding func-
tional coupling during the control of imitation. We hypoth-
esized that, based on animacy cues, rTPJ could influence
brain regions associated with the preparation and control
of movement, such as frontoparietal mirror system regions
and premotor cortex more generally. To evaluate this
hypothesis, we extended our search to include the entire
brain. This analysis revealed that rTPJ was functionally
coupled with a region of dorsomedial pFC, located in
Brodmannʼs area 6 of premotor cortex, as well as other
brain regions that are located outside the motor system
(Supplementary Table S2 and Supplementary Figure S2).
Because of the exploratory nature of this PPI analysis,
coupled with the fact that our design was not initially
chosen (and thus not optimized) for PPI analyses (McLaren
et al., 2012), these findings are not discussed further in the
main text. However, in Supplementary Figure S2, we offer
a preliminary interpretation for the PPI results emerging
in brain regions that were hypothesized to show functional
coupling with rTPJ. The rationale for including the PPI find-
ings in supplementary information is for these results to
provide a starting point for future research investigating
the control of imitation using connectivity analyses.
Manipulation Checks
A repeated-measures ANOVA was used to compare how
realistic participants rated actions according to form
(human, nonhuman) and belief (motion capture, com-
puter animation). The results showed that actions of the
human hand were rated as more realistic (M = 8.5, SE =
0.37) than actions of the non-human-like hand (M = 5.6,
SE= 0.44), F(1, 18) = 17.02, p= .001, ηp
2 = .47. Similarly,
motion capture actions were rated as more realistic (M =
8.7, SE= 0.34) than computer animation actions (M= 7.2,
SE = 0.48), F(1, 18) = 21.9, p < .001, ηp
2 = .54 (Figure
1D). When the latter was analyzed with the between-
subject factor that indicates whether participants believed
the cover story (yes or no), no significant interaction with
the Belief effect on realism ratings was found, F(1, 18) =
2.7, p = .12, ηp
2 = .13.
DISCUSSION
The present findings demonstrate divergence between
how the perception of animacy influences neural and
behavioral responses during the control of imitation. The
data show that rTPJ is sensitive to the presence of both
bottom–up and top–down animacy cues, despite no ad-
ditional interference to RTs. These results suggest that
comparable patterns of interference during inhibition of
imitation can engage different brain circuits: Only when
the agent both looks human and is believed to be human
is rTPJ involved. This suggests that rTPJ controls imitation
based on who is being observed, both in terms of anotherʼs
appearance as well as what is known about him or her.
Moreover, our findings suggest that rTPJ is biologically
tuned to control automatic imitation of human agents.
Is rTPJ Specialized for Controlling Interactions
with Animate Agents?
Imitative tendencies are modulated by whom we share
social interactions with (van Baaren et al., 2009). For exam-
ple, we copy othersʼ actions more if they appear human-
like (Gowen & Poliakoff, 2012; Press, 2011) or prosocial
(Heyes, 2011), which in turn fosters affiliative relations
between individuals (Chartrand & Lakin, 2013). Although
inferior frontal and parietal cortices have been consistently
implicated in producing imitative responses (Iacoboni,
2009), little is known about the brain circuits that control
the tendency to imitate some individuals more than others.
Here we show that right rTPJ plays a role in controlling
imitation based on who is being observed, both in terms
of the agentʼs physical appearance as well as what we
believe about them.
Brass and colleagues have proposed that rTPJ indexes
whether an observed action is attributable to oneself or
another agent and that, in conjunction with anterior mPFC,
it forms a neural circuit that regulates the distinction be-
tween self and other (Brass et al., 2009). In this study, we
build upon this cognitive model by demonstrating that
rTPJ is sensitive to how human the observed agent is. As
such, in controlling imitation, rTPJ distinguishes who or
what is “out there” (Frith & Frith, 2010), showing greater
sensitivity to agentsʼ actions that are believed to be made
by a human and look human-like. Indeed, if only one cue
to human animacy is present, human-like form or a belief
that the movement has human origins, the response in
rTPJ does not show the same sensitivity to action con-
gruency. This suggests that rTPJ is biologically tuned to
resolve conflict between oneʼs own actions and actions of
other humans.
The comparable congruency effect measured in RTs
when one or both animacy cues are present is infor-
mative to understand the response in rTPJ. First, it repli-
cates prior work, which showed instructions (beliefs)
about animacy do not influence imitative tendencies when
appearance and kinematics are already human-like (Press,
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Gillmeister, & Heyes, 2006). Second, it suggests that com-
parable levels of interference can be resolved using differ-
ent brain circuits depending on the level of human animacy
one imbues to an agent. In other words, although the
presence of two human animacy cues did not interfere
with performance more than one animacy cue, it did
engage rTPJ to a greater extent. This suggestion is consis-
tent with prior neuroimaging evidence that rTPJ is involved
in social more than nonsocial conflict resolution (Brass,
Derrfuss, & von Cramon, 2005). Thus, if an agent is repre-
sented as human-like, rTPJ is engaged in conflict resolution
between performed and observed actions. In nonsocial
cases devoid of a human agent, it is likely that more general
conflict resolution mechanisms may operate, such as those
based on spatial parameters alone (Brass et al., 2005).
Behavioral studies also support the view that some
imitative processes are biologically tuned by showing that
imitative compatibility is independent of spatial compatibil-
ity (Boyer, Longo, & Bertenthal, 2012; Catmur & Heyes,
2011). Although both compatibility effects could stem from
a similar associative learning mechanism (Catmur & Heyes,
2011), rTPJ may only be engaged when others are repre-
sented as human (Brass et al., 2005). In cases devoid of a
human agent, spatial compatibility processes may be suffi-
cient to resolve conflicting cues. However, the presence of
an animate agent may trigger a “social sense” (Kovács,
Téglás, & Endress, 2010), which requires additional pro-
cesses to be engaged during conflict management. For
example, rTPJ has been associated with processes that dis-
tinguish self from other (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009) as well
as with tracking othersʼ mental states, such as beliefs and
desires (Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009; Saxe, 2006). As a
consequence, when interacting with an agent that has
human compared with nonhuman attributes, a greater
demand may be placed on brain circuits that disambiguate
self from other (Brass et al., 2009) or brain circuits that are
engaged when spontaneously tracking what others know
(Kovács et al., 2010). It could be one or both of these
additional processes that engage rTPJ during interactions
with human agents, but further research is required to test
these proposals.
The emergence of specialized neural circuitry for con-
trolling imitation converges with behavioral evidence from
studies of people with ASD, who show intact automatic
imitation abilities (Bird, Leighton, Press, & Heyes, 2007)
but deficits with controlling imitation based on social con-
texts (Cook & Bird, 2012). These findings are consistent
with accounts of ASD that support a deficit in controlling
imitation based on social factors (Southgate & Hamilton,
2008), rather than a deficit in the mirror neuron system
(Oberman & Ramachandran, 2007; Williams, Whiten,
Suddendorf, & Perrett, 2001). Typical development of
mental state reasoning abilities is associated with increas-
ing selectivity of TPJ responses (Gweon, Dodell-Feder,
Bedny, & Saxe, 2012) and rTPJ responses in adulthood
during imitation–inhibition overlap with belief reasoning
tasks (Spengler, von Cramon, & Brass, 2009). As such,
imitative problems in ASD may result from a reduced
“social sense”: An inability to spontaneously “mindread”
or attribute mental states to others (Senju, Southgate,
White, & Frith, 2009), rather than a primary dysfunction
in a system that matches observed and executed actions,
such as the mirror neuron system (Iacoboni, 2009). The
current findings implicate a role for rTPJ in regulating
imitative responses based on the level of human animacy
exhibited by agents.
Limitations and Future Directions
Given the subtle complexities of factors that influence im-
itation during social interaction (Heyes, 2011; van Baaren
et al., 2009), rTPJ is unlikely to be the sole “control center”
for imitation. Anterior mPFC has been shown to control
imitation based on the direction of othersʼ eye gaze (Wang,
Ramsey, &Hamilton, 2011) and a broad set of brain regions
have been implicated in the control of imitation based on
animacy cues (Gowen & Poliakoff, 2012). Furthermore, in
this study, the connectivity analysis provides preliminary
evidence for a functional relationship between rTPJ and
parts of mPFC during the control of imitation based on
animacy cues. Future work should further delineate how
imitative tendencies are controlled and how such control
influences other brain regions involved in imitation, such
as inferior frontal and parietal cortices. Such work could
be valuable to disambiguate, or even reconcile, opposing
claims regarding neurocognitive dysfunction in ASD, some
of which support the view that a mirror neuron dysfunc-
tion is present in ASD (Oberman & Ramachandran, 2007;
Williams et al., 2001) and others that propose that the
control of imitation by social relevance is dysfunctional in
ASD (Cook & Bird, 2012).
Conclusion
The present experiment provides novel insight into the
brain circuits that regulate who we imitate. We show that
in a task that induces a tendency to automatically imitate
othersʼ actions, rTPJ is sensitive to agents that both look
human and are believed to be human. This suggests that
rTPJ is biologically tuned to provide a signal that is involved
with integrating oneʼs own and othersʼ actions during
social interactions.
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Note
1. Although we performed the analysis on the log transforma-
tion of the variables, we report the raw means in Figure 2A.
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